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NOTES AND COMMENTS
so well informed as to the reasons which impelled the enactment.24
A statute otherwise valid should not be stricken down though the
policy upon which it rests in a vicious one.25 Even though it be
doubtfully assumed that a desirable result was obtained in the instant
case, it is submitted that the short-cut by which the court reached
its objective affords little satisfaction to the proponents of the act
and those injuriously affected by its fall.
PROCEDURE
CONCLUSIVENESS OF SHERIFF'S RETURN
In a recent case the Indiana Appellate Court held:
(1) that an alleged non-resident defendant in an action m personam (to
recover an unpaid loan) properly raised the question of jurisdiction
over his person, where the sheriff had returned that the defendant
had been served by leaving a copy at his last and usual place of
residence, by an answer in abatement rather than by a motion to
quash;
(2) that the taking of a deposition to be used on the trial of the
issues raised by the answer in abatement did not constitute a general
appearance in the action; and
(3) that because the fact as to the residence of the defandant was
not presumptively within the knowledge of the sheriff, the defendant
was not bound by the usual conclusive presumption as to the correct-
ness of a sheriff's return. Donnelley v. Thorne, - Ind. App. -,
51 N.E. (2d) 873 (1943).
The first two propositions decided are unquestionably correct and
find uniform support in the previous Indiana cases. The motion to
quash is properly used only where the issue sought to be raised is
one which can be decided on the record itself and which, therefore,
does not require the proof of extrinsic facts for it3 decision. The
issue raised was as to the residence of the defendant in the state
and clearly the proper procedure for raising the question is by
answer in abatement and not by a motion to quash. Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Black, 80 Ind. 513 (1881). In view of that fact that the taking of a
desposition on the merits of a case is not a general appearance,
Coplinger v. The David Gibson, 14 Ind. 480 (1860), it follows that
the taking of a deposition on an answer in abat ment is not a
general appearance. The fact that the evidence adduced on the
taking of the deposition may be related in part to the merits of
the case would not alter the result.
The third point decided goes beyond any previcus Indiana case
on this subject so far as the language of the opinion is concerned
although obviously the result reached is quite proper, and indeed
necessary.
The Supreme Court cases on this subject have held that in the
24. Vandali. R.R. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N.E. 289 (1914);
Pittsbui h, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. State, 180 Ind. 245, 102 N.E.
25 i.±91j); State v. Barrett, 172 Ind. 169, 87 N.E. 7 (1909).
25. Mount, frus ee, v. State ex rel. Richey, 90 Ind. 29 (1883).
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absence of collusion between the plaintiff and the sheriff, the sheriff's
return is conclusive and not subject to -attack either directly or
collaterally. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 172 Ind. 140, 86 N.E. 963,
aff'd, 232 U.S. 236 (1913); Johnston Harvester Co. v. Bartley, 81
Ind. 406 (1882) (and cases cited); see also, Groff v. Warner, 44
Ind. App. 544, '89 N.E. 609 (1909). In the Bartley case by direct
attack on special appearance the defendant sought to raise the ques-
tion that the return that an agent of the defendant had been served
at his residence was false. It was held that the return was con-
clusive. On the other hand the Supreme Court has held that under
the excusable neglect statute the presumption may be controverted.
Nietert v. Trentman, 104 Ind. 390, 4 N.E. 306 (1885), reaffirming
Smith v. Noe, 30 Ind. 117 (1868).
It is conceded in the cases that if the defendant is a non-resident
of the state he is not bound by the principal doctrine on the general
theory that a state may not exercise a jurisdiction by means of a
conclusive presumption which it does not have as a matter of con-
stitutional law or under the conflict of laws. Miedreich v. Lauenstein,
supra; Cavanaugh v. Smith, 84 Ind. 380 (1882). The instant case
comes squarely within this admitted exception and it was a complete
answer to the plaintiff's contention to-say that the defendant must
as a matter of constitutional law be permitted to show directly (or
on the collateral attack of a default judgment) that the state had
no jurisdiction as such over his person. The matter of fraud is im-
material. This result had previously been reached in the case of
Ramsey v. Rule, 98 Ind. App. 205, 188 N.E. 792 (1934), and it would
necessarily follow from the proposition that a default judgment would
be subject to collateral attack. Cavanaugh v. Smith, supra.
The opinion, however, relies upon the previous cases of State
of New Jersey v. Shirk, 75 Ind. App. 275, 127 N.E. 861 (1921), and
Papuschak v. Burich, 97 Ind. App. 100, 185 N.E. 876 (1935). In the
first case the State of New Jersey had sued, in the State of In-
diana, a New Jersey corporation for delinquent taxes and had re-
covered a default judgment based upon a sheriff's return to the
effect that the sheriff had served AB, its president. The plaintiff
then sued the original defendant and its officers and stockholders
on the original judgment. The defendants filed a cross-complaint
(but the facts do not disclose whether or not it could be sustained
under the time limit of the excusable neglect statute), and the Appellate
Court held that the defendants should be permitted to show that
AB was not the president of the corporation. The decision, however,
was on the ground that because the plaintiff had directed the sheriff
to serve AB as president that the sheriff's return was "fraudulent"
and the judgment therefore was "void." There was no showing that
the plaintiff had made other than an honest mistake. The Appellate
Court, in language, avoided the Bartley case and brought the case
in line with the accepted doctrine to the effect that a fraudulent re-
turn may be attacked although the fraud was of a constructive nature.
In the second case, in an action to set aside a previous default
judgment, the sheriff had returned that the defendant had been
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served at his last and usual place of residence. He was defaulted
and the original judgment was vacated. It was held that he should
be permitted to prove that the summons had not bean left at his
residence but had been left at an address in an adjoining city. The
case was decided on the authority of the Shirk case because it was
proved that the plaintiff, in the action to set asidi the original
judgment, had instructed the sheriff to serve the defendant at an
address which turned out to be the wrong address. Again there was
no proof of anything other than an honest mistake. Neither case
is authority for the proposition that of itself a sheriff's return as
to the fact of agency or residence is open to attack. They extend the
concept of a fraudulent or collusive return to the case where a
plaintiff innocently induces a mistaken return.
No case decided by the Supreme Court has been found which
departs from the general proposition that even on direct attack, where
the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, the correct-
ness of the sheriff's reutrn cannot be questioned. The recent cases
on the subject have all been decided by the Appellate Court, and the
distinctions made find no sanction in the decisions o, the Supreme
Court. Due to the fact that an Appellate Court decision is not a
precedent in the Supreme Court, Fletcher Ave. S. & L. Assn. v.
Zeller, - Ind. -, 27 N.E. (2d) 351 (1940), the Indiana law
on this subject is still unsettled.
It is certainly doubtful, as a matter of policy, whether the
Appellate Court decisions can be sustained. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to sustain the proposition that there is a distinction be-
tween a sheriff's return as to the identity of an individual and the
place of his residence. The rule in question has never been based
upon the theory that the sheriff's return was not subject to attack
because he was presumed to know that the person Eerved was the
person intended. Indeed, a sheriff can be mistaken abcut the identity
of a person as frequently as he can be mistaken concerning his
agency or the place of his residence. The rule rests not upon a
presumption as to the sheriff's knowledge or lack of knowledge, but
upon the public policy against litigating in all default cases the cor-
rectness of the sheriff's return except under the excusable neglect
statute and within the time limits fixed by that statute. The time
limit would not be applicable if actual fraud could be shown, as the
statute has been held not to preclude an attack upon ai judgment for
this reason. Cory v. Howard, 88 Ind. App. 503, 164 N.E. 639 (1929).
Indeed, fraud which goes to the exercise of jurisdiction renders a
judgment subject to collateral attack. Glansman v. Ledbetter, 190
Ind. 505, 130 N.E. 230 (1921).
In a default case as against a defendant who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the state, it would seem that the decision in the
Lauenstein caqe should be followed. Certainly also in a case where
a defendant 'y an answer in abatement challenges the state's juris-
diction (as -ich) over him, a conclusive presumption as to the
correctness oi the sheriff's return cannot be used to create a juris-
diction which the state does not possess as a matter of constitutional
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law. In any other case where the defendant undertakes to raise the
question as to the correctness of the sheriff's return by an answer
in abatement it would seem that sound policy requires that the
Bartley case be followed.
It is open to the defendant to persuade the sheriff that he has
made a mistake, in which instance the sheriff would be privileged
to file an amended return which would dispose of the question. Walker
v. Shelbyville & R. T. Co., 80 Ind. 452 (1882). In view of the fact
that he is liable to the defendant for a "false" return, even although
onestly made, Diedreich v. Lauenstein, supra, this procedure normally
would be effective.
The real difficulty in the cases involving a false return as to
a service at the defendant's last and usual place of residence arises
out of the Indiana provision on this subject which frequently re-
suits in an unconstitutional service of process. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.),
c. 38, Sec. 56, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) Sec. 2-803 provides simply
that service of summons on a defendant may be had ". . . by leaving
a copy thereof at his usual or last place of residence." While it is
settled that service at the last and usual place of residence is a con-
stitutional substitute for personal service, Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind.
429 (1861), it is likewise settled that service of this character is
invalid if in its application it cannot reasonably be expected to give
actual notice to the defendant. This, the simple leaving of a sum-
mons at the home of a defendant from which he and his family are
temporarily absent is not due process of law, and a default judgment
based upon such service is subject to collateral attack on federal
constitutional grounds. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503 (1895); Mc-
Donald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1916). (The latter case involved service
by publication, but the language of the opinion supports the proposition
that any substitute for personal service can only be sustained when it
is the best available under the circumstances, and only when it
reasonably calculated to bring actual notice to the defendant). A
valid provision on this subject necessarily involves the acceptance of
the Federal Rule, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 4(d), and requires
that the summons be left ". .. with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein . . .", thus prohibiting the leaving
of the summons at the residence when it is in fact unoccupied.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WAS MIDDLEMAN AN AGENT OR AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR?
Appellant sawmill operator brought this appeal from an in-
dustrial board order awarding compensation to appellee timber cutter
under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act., Held, reversed.
Appellee was not an employee of the appellant for purposes of work-
men's compensation, although he was hired by a timber scalper
1. Acts 1929, c. 172, § 1 et seq., Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-
1201 et seq.
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